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Since military strategy is part of the 
decision-making process among partici-
pants in world politics, we may begin 
our examination of the subject by con-
sidering the arena of world affairs. A 
few years ago the professional students 
of international law, international rela-
tions and strategy would give a glib 
reply when questioned about the iden-
tity of the participants in world politics. 
They would talk in terms of the "state" 
or the "nation state". And this is still 
the conventional answer. But it has 
become increasingly unsatisfactory for 
anyone who must look beyond legal 
forms to the facts of power in a rapidly 
changing world. The conception of a 
"state" is formalistic. According to tra-
ditional theory all "states" are "equal" 
once officially recognized by the 
existing members of the state system. 
Such a conception can scarcely be taken 
literally by anyone who looks at the 
power relations. among governments. 
Side by side with the language of 
international law there has grown up a 
vocabulary designed to describe the 
distribution of effective power. It 
speaks of great powers, middle powers, 
small powers and dependents; and, more 
recently, in view of the tendency 
toward bipolarity, of "superpowers" or 
"giant" powers. It is clear that any 
serviceable categories will use two sets 
of terms, one for formal authority, and 
the other for effective control. If we say 
that sixty or seventy states are sovereign 
equals, we must also be able to say that 
the effective pattern of power in the 
world arena is bipolar, polypolar, multi-
polar, or whatever else the facts indi-
cate. We can make very important dis-
tinctions between lawful power (au-
thoritative and controlling), naked 
power (controlling but not authorita-
tive), and nominal power (authoritative 
but not controlling). 
The disadvantage of taking the state 
as the unit of participation in world 
politics is not only that the distinction 
between formal and effective power is 
blurred, but that other participants have 
become so important that it is mis-
leading to relegate them to a sub-
ordinate position. International inter-
governmental organizations have been 
set up by official action for general 
purposes (League of Nations, United 
Nations), and for a diversity of special 
purposes (health, science, and the like). 
It is true that these organizations 
operate under the formal authority of 
national states. But an examination of 
their influence will show that on some 
matters they are of decisive importance. 
The result of having an international 
hierarchy of officials, and assemblies 
and councils that meet frequently is to 
establish a new mechansim of much 
greater weight on many subjects than 
was possible when intergovernmental 
cooperation was sporadic and bilateral. 
The list of participants needs also to 
be enlarged by adding transnational 
political parties. They are not always 
under the domination of anyone gov-
ernment. The communist movement, 
for instance, was a power factor in 
world affairs long before the seizure of 
power in Moscow in 1917. International 
bands of revolutionists were active for 
decades seeking to organize bases for 
revolutionary seizures whenever crises 
of unemployment, of military defeat, or 
some other catastrophe created a revolu-
tionary situation. Even when a revolu-
tionary party organization is trans-
formed into a humble appendage of an 
existing government, some of its remain-
ing influence comes from the impression 
in various quarters that it represents 
something bigger than the government 
in question. 
Besides transnational political parties 
there is much to be said for adding the 
supranational pressure groups to the list 
of effective participants in the decision-
making process of the globe. Pressure 
groups are set up for the purpose of 
influencing policy. They differ from 
political parties in that they do not 
formulate comprehensive political pro-
grams, or openly put up candidates in 
elections. A recent tabulation suggests 
that about a thousand supranational 
pressure organizations are actively pro-
moting changes in the educational, 
medical, economic and other relations 
among peoples. 
When we go behind supranational 
pressure groups and parties we typically 
come to private associations that 
operate across national boundaries. 
These organizations are not primarily 
specialized to the power value; rather, 
they use power incidentally to other 
purposes. In this connection think of 
the impact of business organizations 
that reach across many frontiers, and of 
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trade unions, churches, scientific and 
professional associations. Private organi-
zations have often been strong enough 
to upset governments, and to give de-
cisive help to new regimes. 
If we push our analysis far enough 
we come to individual human beings. 
Influential individuals (and families) 
often operate transnationally. 
The position of the military strategist 
in the modem decision-making process 
is highly diversified. In some places he is 
the advisor to a national government, as 
in the U.S. Elsewhere he may be the 
advisor of a government that purports 
to represent several nations. When the 
element of coercion plays a significant 
part, we speak of an empire (like the 
Soviet Empire) rather than a unified 
national state (like Sweden). In some 
cases the military strategist is advising a 
small political class that is relatively cut 
off from the rest of the society under its 
control. The members of this small 
ruling class may follow world affairs, 
and share the news and comment cur-
rent among all who keep in touch with 
happenings throughout the globe. Below 
the political elite the society may be 
composed of kinship groups more con-
cerned with tribal affairs than with the 
world at large. The underlying popula-
tion may be nomadic or agricultural. It 
may remain self-absorbed in the tread-
mill of the seasons and the world views 
of a traditional culture. The underlying 
population may be more or less dis-
organized as a result of employment as a 
labor force in mines, plantations and 
other large-scale operations. The politi-
cal role of the strategic advisor is cir-
cumscribed by the integration of the 
top decision makers with the society as 
a whole. 
The military strategist often grades 
over to the role of a police officer or a 
subversionist. We all know the usual 
distinction between a military specialist 
and a policeman. According to our 
tradition the proper function of the 
armed forces is to repel foreign enemies, 
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and we are inclined to look with a 
jaundiced eye upon attempts to involve 
these forces in the maintaining of in-
ternal order. The civilian tradition of 
English speaking countries has led us to 
put blocks in the road of executives 
who want to use the armed forces at 
home. (Our history recalls the abuse of 
authority in the hope of preserving 
unpopular dynasties). 
In modern despotisms it is impossible 
to recognize a sharp line between mili-
tary and police forces. Consider the 
interpenetration of the German officers 
corps by the Nazi party, and the com-
plex allocations of responsibility for 
compulsory labor camps at home and 
abroad, and for extermination camps; 
and for the encouragement of foreign 
subversion. 
To some extent the encouragement 
of foreign subversion has always been 
part of the military function. It has 
been taken for granted that an intelli-
gence job would be done in advance on 
possible opponents (in addition to war-
time operations). Inducements would be 
employed to encourage spies to betray 
the nation. Often these operations im-
plicate large numbers of people. ryle 
hear of the 70,000 agents used by the 
Germans in anticipation of 1870.) In 
more recent years the appearance of 
despotism, bipolarization and acute 
ideological conflict have enormously 
increased the strategic role of subversive 
activity. 
Under modern conditions, therefore, 
military officers sometimes find them-
selves acting as advisors and liaison men 
to very strange groups indeed. They 
may work with supranational political 
parties to improve the strategy and 
tactics of espionage, sabotage and street 
fighting. From Nuremburg and other 
sources we know of the prewar use of 
military advisors in connection with 
paramilitary formations and pressure 
organizations of many kinds. (Thele is, 
by the way, a big literature on the 
revolutionary technique evolved by the 
social revolutionists of the nineteenth 
century and the early twentieth, some 
of whom had professional training and 
experience). 
When we consider the intimacy of 
association between strategists and top 
decision makers, the connection appears 
to be closest when the government has 
been taken over by military coup. But 
the top man may be satisfied with his 
own genius as a planner and a com-
mander, so that anyone who is invited 
to advise finds that he is relegated to a 
modest role. Even under these circum-
stances, however, the advisor may be 
more than a "yes-man" who thinks only 
when spoken to. He may continue to 
make independent analyses of the fac-
tors that influence the security of the 
whole nation, and seek to clarify the 
minds of top decision makers concern-
ing long-run matters. Cases of this kind 
have occurred among the advisors of 
warlords who seized power in some 
province in China. There have been 
nationally-minded advisors who tried to 
shepherd their warlord along the path of 
unifying the whole Chinese people in 
order to maintain the integrity of China 
under modern perils. 
It is noteworthy that trained officers 
are not as a rule at the top of modern 
mass party movements which have cap-
tured power. Actually there is latent 
and often overt tension between the 
leadership and trained officers. Men like 
Mussolini, Lenin and Hitler were gifted 
propagandists and organizers of mass 
movements who looked with mixed 
feelings at general staffs and top com-
mands. The communist party was so 
fearful that the central policy of the 
organization would be under the domi-
nation of military specialists that they 
made a cult of the supremacy of the 
political man over the specialists. An 
entirely new set of officers was trained 
as rapidly as possible after the Civil War 
period in the hope of wiping out ideo-
logical residues of the pre-Bolshevik era, 
and of indoctrinating officers of the 
Red Army with the fundamental im-
portanee of subordinating themselves to 
the eentral policy organs of the party 
(and government). Threatened by revolt 
and intervention, however, the commu-
nist rulers of the Soviet world have been 
recruited from individuals who almost 
invariably have political police training 
and experience. The Nazi movement 
took over control of the officers by the 
tactics of "divide and rule." Compliant 
members of the officers corps were 
advanced, while the more towering pro-
fessional personalities were gradually 
disposed of by whatever methods (in-
cluding false charges) were expedient. 
In a nation possessing a strong tradi-
tion of popular rule, like the U.S. and 
Great Britain, the political factors in the 
formulation of strategy are in one sense 
simple. In Britain the responsibility for 
top decision rests with the Cabinet and 
the Parliament, and eventually the elec-
torate. In the United States the integra-
tion rests with the President and the 
Congress, and ultimately the electorate. 
Formally speaking, political assump-
tions are communicated to the strategist 
by the competent political authorities, 
who receive advice for the overall imple-
mentation of the national policy goals 
and objectives recommended. Top au-
thorities clarify and commit national 
policy in the light of the advice ten-
dered by the military strategists, and by 
thosc charged with diplomatic, eco-
nomic and ideological implements of 
policy. 
In practice the relation of the mili-
tary strategist to the top is far from 
attaining such diagrammatic clarity. 
First of all, the words in which national 
goals and objectives are stated tend to 
be ambiguous or ultraspecific. That is, if 
the President or the Congress is asked 
what they want to achieve in the 
domain of foreign policy in the next 
five years, the replies are likely to sound 
very ambiguous indeed. We know of 
course that the national security calls 
for the deterrence of aggression by 
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foreign countries, abstinence from 
aggressive acts on our part, and success-
ful counteraction if necessary. But the 
translation of these broad requirements 
into more operational terms is not easy. 
By ultraspecificity is meant words that 
sound definite enough, but which must 
be taken with a grain of salt. Even the 
most emphatic and explicit statement 
may be a poor guide for the future. (In 
the U.S. the strategist is likely to re-
member Korea). 
Uncertain as this may appear to be, 
such are the facts of life in popular 
government. The military strategist 
must adapt himself to performing his 
obligation to the nation within this 
framework. On reflection, however, we 
conclude that the advisor-planner is by 
no means as devoid of guidance as the 
foregoing paragraph may suggest. By the 
proper use of the appropriate tools of 
investigation and analysis, much can be 
learned. By examining the· trends of 
official policy in this country and 
abroad, the strategist is able to predict 
some of the situations involving national 
security that may arise, together with 
the policy objectives likely to be sup-
ported at home and abroad. The projec-
tion of past trends will often show that 
conflicts are in the making (typically 
when two opposing developments are 
practically certain to meet). The re-
arming of Germany, even in pre-Nazi 
days, pointed toward changes in the 
balance of power throughout Europe 
(and hence throughout the globe). Ade-
quate interpretation of the future obvi-
ously calls for more than simple extra-
polation of past lines of change, and the 
uncovering of facilities or incompatible 
trends. It is important to conduct a 
scientific examination of the balance of 
factors that have favored or retarded a 
given response, and to include in the 
assessment of the future, estimates of 
the probable presence or absence of 
these conditioning factors. 
If we look at the history of strategic 
planning and recommendation, it is 
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clear that the professionals have some-
times failed to make use of the tools of 
comparative historical, scientific, and 
projective analysis which are essential to 
the task. Our war histories are now 
calling attention to a number of alleged 
limitations that affected strategy be-
tween the two world wars. It appears 
that too much weight was given to the 
headlines of the twenties and early 
thirties. The prevailing tone of the 
Presidents, the Congress, the political 
parties, the pressure groups, and the 
press was "isolationist" Since the U.S. 
had no diplomatic commitments to an 
ally, forward planning was often made 
on the. assumption that the U.S. would 
go it alone in the war crisis of the 
future. 
The tools of analysis to which I have 
referred in making an assessment of 
political factors affecting U.S. policy 
were actually used with success by the 
advisors of other governments. Im-
portant elements in Great Britain, for 
instance, correctly foresaw that if 
Britain were threatened by a resurgent 
Germany, the U.S. would interpret our 
national security to include the defense 
of Britain, and the prevention of the 
unification of Western Europe by con-
quest 
In developing strategies in execution 
of national objectives, once clarified (or 
postulated), a fundamental question is 
how much initial loss can be endured by 
the nation. How much loss can the U.S. 
afford to suffer at the outbreak of a war 
in which modern weapons are used by 
the opponent in his surprise attack? 
This is a more complicated question 
than tabulating and estimating data 
about weapons and industrial capacity. 
It is necessary to estimate the crucial 
political factors. Will losses of a certain 
magnitude (of people and production 
facilities) produce a disproportionately 
great increase in disunity? Will this 
significantly influence the strength of 
the immediate counterattack against the 
enemy? Will it importantly affect the 
restoration and use of production 
capacity in order to mount a decisive 
offensive within a relatively short time? 
At first it appears that there are no 
exact parallels from the past. Crippling 
as the Japanese surprise attack was, for 
instance, it did not demolish a large 
fraction of our production facilities, nor 
decimate a significant fraction of our 
population. But it is possible to discern 
pertinent variables in past situations. 
Suppose that we try to envisage the 
direction, intensity and efficiency of the 
response of the American people should 
our industrial centers be made unusable 
by surprise, and the scale of civilian 
casualties reach unprecedented heights. 
There have been cases of disaster in 
which panic has been held at a mini-
mum. One factor was the very long 
anticipation shared by the public that 
the disaster might occur. Another point 
is that the members of the community 
must not feel that they deserve to suffer 
because they have been led into disaster 
by self-serving and short-sighted men. 
Furthermore, in the midst of a disas-
trous blow unity may be sustained if 
there is equality of treatment of all 
sufferers, irrespective of region, religion 
and color. 
In calculating strengths and vulner-
abilities in so far as they involve politi-
cal factors, it is essential to consider all 
major deprivations to assess the 
probable response of the different com-
ponents of the population, and to esti-
mate the changes in attitude that are 
likely to be brought about between now 
(the time the estimate is made) and 
when the attack is postulated to occur. 
All this has a bearing on such major 
estimates as the size and nature of the 
burden to be imposed upon the nation 
in advance of hostilities. Assume that 
we can make a dependable estimate of 
the level of armament that would exer-
cise a stateable degree of deterrence of 
potential attackers. An element in the 
final choice of armament level is the 
probable internal effect of various levels 
upon U.S. unity. (Can we say, for 
instance, that when a specified level is 
cxceeded, a comparatively sharp in-
crease in disaffection follows?) 
Up to this point we have looked at 
the position of the military strategist in 
the modem world, and paying particular 
attention to the political factors perti-
nent to the goals, objectives, strengths 
and vulnerabilities of the national policy 
served by the strategist. We shift now to 
. another dimension of the problem, and 
examine some political elements that 
enter into the response of potential or 
actual opponents. We must, see the 
world from the standpoint of the cur-
rent and the prospective decision 
makcrs of foreign powers. Hence we 
encounter the same kind of uncertainty 
that enters into the interpretation of 
our decision makers. Even if we were 
able to ask those in charge of top policy 
abroad when they propose to attack (if 
at all), the replies (even though candid) 
might be ambiguous, or show the same 
ultraspecificity of which we remarked 
before. We can no more take the dic-
tators at face value than we can take the 
democrats. In evaluating even direct 
testimony we must consider the imprint 
of another purge, or of a great success 
or defeat in an intermediate country. 
The examination of the policy goals, 
objectives, strengths, and vulnerabilities 
of the potential opponent calls for the 
estimation of developments, assuming 
first that our policy remains much the 
same. Later we bring in the considera-
tion of the impact of possible changes in 
our own policy. A key question in 
reference to the decision-making process 
abroad is parallel to the question that 
we posed in reference to our own 
nation: What are the present authorita-
tive prescriptions for the making of such 
basic decisions as war or peace? Do the 
agencies charged with nominal authority 
appear to have effective control? Who 
are the effective decision makers: What 
are their politically significant perspec-
tives? How are these perspectives 
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influenced by cultural characteristics? 
Class origins? Experience? Personality 
traits? By the security or insecurity of 
the position of leaders now or at various 
levels of crisis? In the future if changes 
occur in the group composition of the 
leadership, will it make any difference 
so far as the policies in which we are 
interested are concerned? For instance, 
if the leadership is widely recruited 
from diverse nationality groups, will it 
make for more or less internal unity, or 
for more or less aggressiveness in foreign 
relations? If the coming elite is largely 
recruited from the recently established 
families of the army, police, party 
bureaucracy, official bureaucracy, will it 
have any significant effect? (For in-
stance: are those with military police 
experience so sensitive to internal divi-
sion that they are timid about launching 
a war? Are they so much impressed by 
the progress of subversion at home that 
they believe a war to be necessary to 
preserve the regime? Are they so much 
impressed by report of subversion 
abroad that war appears unnecessary in 
order to win out in the world struggle? 
Are they impressed by the absence of 
successful subversion abroad so that 
security seems only possible as a result 
of successful war?) Are the personalities 
who come to the top in the regime 
willing to take great responsibility for 
important decisions; or, on the con-
trary, are they accustomed to evade 
risky decisions by temporizing? Does 
this mean a drift into war because the 
top leaders do not stand out against a 
growing consensus among their num-
bers? Or does it mean that war is 
continually postponed?) 
The foregoing questions have been 
directed to considering the composition 
of the decision makers, and assessing the 
perspectives in which they are likely to 
view political matters of importance to 
our security. A further step is necessary. 
Besides thinking of the results of a 
possible change in elite composition, we 
must estimate the probability that 
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significant changes will in fact occur. 
This calls for a systematic examination 
of the social processes which are likely 
to affect the political process of the 
opposing power. Without making an 
exhaustive inventory, we can at least 
direct attention to some dimensions of 
the total problem: 
Wealth (economic institutions). What 
are the probable changes in the tech-
nology and the magnitude of produc-
tion? Standards of living? Saving and 
investment? How will these develop-
ments affect the perspectives of the 
political elite? 
Respect (social class institutions). 
How is the class structure likely to 
change? That is, will the upper, middle 
and lower respect groupings become 
more or less mobile? Will this increase 
or decrease the unity of the community 
as a whole? How will these changes 
influence the perspectives of the effec-
tive elite of power? 
Well-being (safety, health, comfort). 
How are the numbers, and the physical 
and mental health, of the population 
likely to change? Will internal tensions 
be increased and the pressure for ex-
ternal expansion increased or reduced? 
Enlightenment (public information, 
civic education). Will information about 
the outside world available at all levels 
become more fantastic, so that the 
external world is viewed as vile and 
pusillanimous? Will the information 
available at the top share this image 
progressively, or will it on the contrary 
diverge from the popular picture, 
creating perpetual sources of tension in 
the control of international chauvinism? 
Despite the images purveyed in mass 
media of communication controlled by 
the government, will undercurrents of 
scepticism result in a general disinclina-
tion to credit officially propagated 
statements, and produce a feeble posi-
tive faith in the destiny of the whole 
community in its foreign relations? 
Skill (professions and occupations). 
Will the growth of industrialization 
bring with it a network of scientific, 
engineering, and skilled labor talent so 
absorbed in improving their own condi-
tions of life and opportunities that there 
will be little interest in external expan-
sion? Or will the growth of some skill 
groups create strong vested interests in 
expansion, in order to gain greater scope 
than the home countries permit? 
Affection (family, fraternal institu-
tions). Will the pervading suspiciousness 
characteristic of all forms of public life 
lead to intense emotional bonds among 
members of the family and the early 
friendship group, with the result that 
the security of the intimate circle is 
more significant than more grandiose 
dreams of expansion in the name of 
larger social units? Or will the concern 
for the family have the effect of leaving 
politics in the hands of egocentric, 
calculating and unscrupulous persons 
who are concerned with the vast drama 
of world politics, and willing to take all 
the risks involved? 
Rectitude (standards of right and 
wrong, of responsibility). Will the older 
religious faiths continue to survive and 
indeed gain in vitality? Will secular 
doctrines lose their capacity to involve 
fervent faith and self-sacrifice? How will 
these changing standards influence the 
outlook of persons who have an oppor-
tunity to take a strong role in political 
affairs? (e.g., will they withdraw and 
leave the decision to the utterly un-
scrupulous; or will they develop a sense 
of responsibility for ameliorating the 
general condition of tension?). 
It will be observed that the categories 
employed here refer to a way of de-
scribing the social process of any com-
munity, whether a local nieghborhood, 
a nation, or even the world as a whole. 
We speak of the social process as man 
pursuing values through institutions 
using resources. The values (the cate-
gories of preferred events) are kept few 
for convenience of analysis (eight: 
power, wealth, respect, well-being, en-
lightenment, skill, affection, rectitude). 
The specialized patterns by which these 
values are shaped and shared are the 
institutions. Social processes may be 
compared with one another according 
to the degree in which values are widely 
made available to the members of the 
whole community, or the degree to 
which they are concentrated in rela-
tively few hands. The first is a society 
that is relatively democratic; the second, 
relatively despotic (or a traditional 
oligarchy). 
Having appraised the current and 
prospective decision-making process of 
the opposing power, the strategist is in a 
position to evaluate the probable impact 
of the various instruments of action 
available to his own decision makers. 
Repeating a previous analysis it is con-
venient for many purposes to say that 
the goals and objectives of national 
policy may be sought by four major 
instruments of policy: military, eco-
nomic, diplomatic, ideological. The dis-
tinctive means of military strategy are 
arms; of economic strategy, goods; of 
diplomacy, deals; and ideological 
strategy, words. In terms of distinctive 
effects military strategy aims at destruc-
tion (or production), economic strategy 
at scarcity (or abundance), diplomacy at 
the disunity of leaders (or unity), and 
ideological strategy at the disunity of 












Destruction (or protection) 
Scarcity (or abundance) 
Disunity of Leaders (or unity) 
Disunity of Masses (or unity) 
The formulation and execution of 
military strategy calls for the proper 
articulation of all distinctive military 
means and effects with all the instru-
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ments by which national policy objec-
tives are sought. The overriding prin-
ciple is that of maximization, or the 
attainment of all the values sought by 
policy at the least cost (appraised in 
terms of those values). When we speak 
of political factors in the formulation of 
strategy we are referring to the assump-
tions that are to be made about the 
national goals and objectives to be 
accomplished; and further the weight to 
be assigned to factors of intention in 
achieving of these aims. 
These instrumentalities of national 
policy may be employed in situations 
short of war, in war, and at the end of 
war. For the moment we are thinking of 
the political factlJrs involved in the use 
of military strategy (in the context of 
policy goals, and in coordination with 
the other instruments of policy) in 
situations short of war, and intended to 
influence the opposing elite. We assume 
that the goals pursued are the deter-
rence of aggression by the opposing 
power, and the maintenance of a posi-
tion which, if necessary, would enable 
us to use force effectively if aggression 
occurs. 
In this connection we note first of all 
that military instruments possess certain 
special advantages in the prosecution of 
national policy in these short-of-war 
situations. I refer to the well-nigh com-
pulsory control that can be exercised 
over the focus of attention of the 
opposing elite by moving our own 
"hardware." Ships, planes and guns are 
very tangible indeed, and exert per-
emptory control over the senses of 
those who are equipped to recognize the 
political significance of weapons. The 
top staffs and decision makers abroad 
must pay the same strict attention to 
our hardware that we do to theirs. 
This point applies universally. But 
there are special factors that predispose 
the members of some ruling elites to 
emphasize the significance of military 
weapons. Suppose that our opponent is 
indoctrinated with the idea that the 
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"capitalist" enemy never does anything 
unless it is the outcome of a deep laid 
and hostile plan. This results in "over-
interpretation" as well as over-sensitive-
ness to whatever weapon changes are 
attributed to us. 
Assume further that the opposing 
elite is heavily indoctrinated about the 
importance of material factors in gen-
eral The emphasis upon such tangibles 
as the weapon and the factory under-
lines the significance attributed to de-
velopments on our side of these matters. 
Suppose that the opposing elite is 
indoctrinated to think of themselves as 
"encircled" by a world conspiracy 
headed by the U.S. This predisposes 
them to give particular attention to 
moves anywhere in the world that 
appear in any way connected with us. 
As instruments of national policy 
during periods of low-burning (as well as 
explosive) crisis it is clear that military 
weapons excel in manageability. They 
are amenable to central direction by 
professional planning and operating per-
sonnel: and they are run with an eye to 
security considerations. 
The disposability of weapons, of 
course, is a factor that often results in 
the abuse of military instruments during 
short-of-war periods. Suppose that the 
problem is to induce the potential 
enemy to abstain from an aggressive 
action. If our weapons are unready, and 
if the intelligence services of the other 
side are in effective working order, it is 
folly to imagine that we are "deterring 
aggression" by moving some of our 
ships, guns and planes closer to their 
boundaries. (The task is always to esti-
mate the opponent's estimate of our 
intentions and capabilities). 
The disposability of military weap-
ons often leads to another abuse, which 
is failure to plan military activity as part 
of a properly prepared joint enterprise, 
involving the articulation of diplomacy, 
economics and ideological instruments. 
A case in point is failure to provide in 
advance for the timing of peacetime 
weapon tests in such a manner as to 
extract the maximum benefit. 
We have seen the impromptu use of 
weapons which brought about the with-
drawal of an opposing power from a 
position judged by us to be contrary to 
our national policy. The use of the 
Berlin airlift is a famous case. A more 
dramatic example would be the use of 
our combined weapons to bring about a 
withdrawal from occupied countries. 
The top decision makers must obviously 
be willing to shoulder the risk of war in 
connection with such moves. Otherwise 
the deterrence effect will be frustrated 
(as above, when the aim was to induce 
the opponent to abstain rather than to 
withdraw). 
By putting so much emphasis upon 
abstinence and withdrawal, we have 
diverted attention from other aims of 
national policy as they affect potential 
opponents. The dominant objective may 
be to induce cooperation for purposes 
compatible with our security. One of 
the declared goals of American policy is 
to bring about by negotiation, if pos-
sible, an end to the present armament 
race on terms compatible with our 
national security. 
It is generally recognized that if this 
objective is to be achieved, a yet more 
fundamental purpose must be realized. I 
refer to the reconstruction of the policy; 
orientation of the opposing power. It is 
not enough from the standpoint of 
national security to gain local and un-
limited success in terms of abstinence, 
withdrawal or cooperation. By this time 
it has become quite clear that the 
outlook must change of those who are 
making the effective decisions else-
where. In a sense our rearmament since 
1945 has been a "short-of-war" activity 
designed to accomplish a permanent 
change, by peaceful means if possible, 
of the effective policies of the Soviet 
Union. By maintaining superiority in 
arms, while abstaining on our part from 
aggressive action, the hope has been to 
reduce the confidence of the Soviet 
Union elite in their doctrinaire outlook 
and their aggressive policies. 
Finally, we turn to the use of mili-
tary instruments in situations short of 
war for the purpose of influencing an 
associated or uncommitted power_ One 
of the objectives can be withdrawaL We 
may want to put a stop to the continu-
ation of measures that in our judgment 
endanger the peace, and promise no 
compensating gains for security. We 
may go so far as to use blockade to 
bring about this modification of policy 
on the part of a power with whom we 
are on generally friendly terms. 
The object may be abstention. We 
may act to prevent extensions of mea-
sures which may appear contrary to our 
national security interests. 
The object may be cooperation. Ob-
viously an overriding aim of NATO is to 
organize cooperative activity against a 
common threat. 
The objective may be reconstruction. 
The U.S. has repeatedly declared itself 
in favor of bringing new institutions 
of unity into existence in Western 
Europe. 
The consideration of any of these 
moves involves an examination of fac-
tors affecting policy in the associated or 
uncommitted country, an examination 
no lcss exhaustive than we have referred 
to in case of an opposing power. With-
out rcitcrating the fundamental cate-
gories, the crucial point is whether our 
influencc will strengthen or weaken 
national unity. Where the ruling elite of 
the associated power does not have the 
support of the underlying masses of the 
population, we are in the delicate posi-
tion of needing to handle our policy 
instruments in such a manner as to bring 
about integration without further weak-
ening of the power in question. Where 
the ruling elite has a great deal of 
popular support we have the problem, 
which has many conspicuous difficul-
ties, of managing our relations in sueh a 
manner as to refrain from compromising 
our friends, and lowering their accept-
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ability at home by seeming to transform 
them into puppets of our national 
needs. 
There is no time to deal with the 
political questions that arise in em-
ploying military instruments of national 
policy in time of general war, or in 
immediate postwar periods. To some 
extent this omission is made because 
most of the modern discussion of our 
subject deals with problems of coalition 
war, and in seeking to work in harness 
with allies who may diverge in im-
portant ideological and organizational 
particulars from one's own nation; and 
in striving to accomplish subversive re-
sults in enemy jurisdiction. 
So far as U.S. public policy has been 
concerned in the past, some of the most 
conspicuous failures have been in 
meeting the problems that arise at the 
end of active hostilities. It is essential to 
define national policy well in advance of 
the "onslaught of peace" if the political 
preparation is to be successfully carried 
through for the mastery of postwar 
situations in ways that contribute to 
national security goals. 
On this note, we conclude. We have 
been viewing the political factors that 
concern national military strategy in a 
world arena whose participants are more 
diversified than the traditional concep-
tion of equal sovereign states. Weare 
dealing with a bipolarizing world, a 
world of international intergovern-
mental organizations, of transnational 
political parties, of transnational pres-
sure groups and individuals who may 
operate across traditional lines. The 
military strategist who is responsible to 
the top decision makers of modern 
powers under these conditions is con-
fronted by a variety of problems and 
tasks that differ in many ways from the 
obligations of his predecessors. The 
political factors include the present and 
prospective assumptions to be enter-
tained about the goals and objectives of 
national policy, and the articulation of 
military instruments with all the 
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instruments at the disposal of national 
policy. The task varies greatly in situa-
tions short of war, in general war and in 
immediate postwar periods. The 
decisions affecting our national security 
now and in the future must be assessed 
by locating the effective as distinct from 
the formal elite, and by exploring the 
affiliations and experiences that influ-
ence their political demands, expecta-
tions and loyalties. In predicting the 
future of policy the impact of change in 
all spheres of the social process must be 
taken into account The potential im-
pact of our own actions enters into the 
evaluation of the important decisions of 
the opposing leadership. Parallel ques-
tions must be raised for associated and 
noncommitted powers, whether the 
objectives are primarily abstinence, 
withdrawal, cooperation or reconstruc-
tion. In general, political factors are 
factors of intention of perspective: of 
conceptions of goal; of expectations 
concerning the past, present and future 
as it affects these goals; and of loyalties. 
The strategy of military instruments in 
this context is to maximize the attain-
ment of our national objectives by 
influencing the expectations that favor 
the actions that serve these security 
rums. 
----tp----
